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Abstract
Self-discipline is the effort an individual exerts to regulate her own moods,
thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative preferences and
temptations. In this paper, we propose a model of self-discipline where a
decision-maker balances the benefits of regulating her moods against a cost
of self-discipline effort. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the
model in a menu-choice framework, and show how costs of self-discipline
can be elicited and compared across individuals. Our model generalizes
well-known models of temptation-driven behavior by viewing temptations as
the endogenous outcome of a self-discipline choice problem.
Keywords: menu-choice, preference for commitment, self-discipline, temptation.
“In reading the lives of great men, I found that the first victory they won was
over themselves ... self-discipline with all of them came first." Harry S. Truman
1 Introduction
Self-discipline is the effort an individual exerts to regulate her own moods. For
example, someone who wants to follow a diet may exercise self-discipline to suppress
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her appetite; someone who wants to save for retirement may exercise self-discipline to
curb her spending-mood; and someone who wants to gain a promotion may exercise
self-discipline to overcome her laziness. By regulating their moods, individuals
reduce the chances that they will make “bad” choices (e.g., overeat, overspend, or
shirk at work). However, the fact that dieters sometimes overeat, savers sometimes
overspend, and careerist sometimes shirk, suggests that self-discipline is not always
easy.
In this paper, we propose an axiomatic model of self-discipline. We view self-
discipline as an effort that a decision-maker (DM) exerts to regulate her own
moods, thereby reducing internal conflicts between her normative preferences and
temptations. Normative preferences reflect the DM’s long-term goals and objectives
(e.g., to lose weight, save for retirement, or gain a promotion). Temptations, on
the other hand, are temporary preferences that can strike at random and reflect
the DM’s immediate desires, urges and cravings (e.g., overeating, overspending, or
shirking). By regulating her moods (e.g., suppressing her appetite, curbing her
spending-mood, or overcoming her laziness), the DM reduces the chances of being
struck by temptations that lead her to make normatively bad choices. On the
other hand, self-discipline may be hard, and so the DM must balance the benefit
of regulating her moods against the costs of self-discipline effort.
In section 2, we provide a formal model of a self-discipline choice problem. Although
self-discipline can represent unobservable efforts, the self-discipline choice problem
induces a preference relation over menus that is – in principle – revealed by choice
behavior. We therefore study the behavioral implications of self-discipline in a
two-period framework, where the DM chooses a menu in the first period anticipating
her self-discipline problem before she selects an alternative in the second period.
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Our main result (Theorem 1) provides an axiomatic characterization of self-discipline
preferences. In particular, two novel axioms identify distinctive features of the
self-discipline model. Temptation Monotonicity reflects the idea that if the ex-post
choice from menu A is normatively better than the ex-post choice from menu B for
every temptation preference that could strike in the second period, then the DM
prefers menu A to menu B. Aversion to Randomization reflects the idea that if DM
has the opportunity to adjust her self-discipline effort, she prefers an early resolution
of uncertainty in order to better respond to self-discipline incentives. Together with
four standard axioms from the menu-choice literature, these behavioral conditions
characterize the testable implications of the self-discipline model in terms of menu-
choice data.
We also show that model parameters can be elicited from preferences over menus
(Theorem 2). In particular, the DM’s normative preferences are uniquely identified
by her commitment ranking over singleton menus,1 and we provide an explicit
formula that shows how the minimal costs of self-discipline can be recovered
from data on singleton equivalents. Finally, we show that a decision-maker with
higher costs of self-discipline values commitment more than one with lower costs,
establishing a comparative measure of self-discipline in terms of behavioral data
(Theorem 3).
Our self-discipline model generalizes well-known models of temptation-driven be-
havior by viewing temptations as the endogenous outcome of a self-discipline choice
problem. For instance, we show in Proposition 1 that the random Strotz model in
Dekel and Lipman [2012] corresponds to the special case of self-discipline preferences
that satisfy a Set Independence axiom (which implies Aversion to Randomization).
Dekel and Lipman [2012] show that random Strotz preferences generalize the Strotz
and self-control models in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001], as well as the multiple
temptation model in Stovall [2010] and dual-self models in Chatterjee and Krishna
[2009] and Olszewski [2007]. As a result, each of these models represent important
special cases of self-discipline preferences.
Other models of temptation-driven behavior overlap with self-discipline preferences.
1It is customary to interpret the commitment ranking as the DM’s normative preference. Noor
[2011] provides a critical discussion of this interpretation.
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Chandrasekher [2014] proposes a generalization of random Strotz, weakening the
assumption that preferences are complete while retaining Set Independence. The
overlap with self-discipline preferences is the random Strotz model. Noor and
Takeoka [2010] characterize convex self-control preferences, which can violate
Aversion to Randomization but satisfy a Set Betweenness axiom that self-discipline
preferences can violate. The overlap with self-discipline preferences is the self-
control model. Dekel et al. [2009] characterize a model with multi-dimensional
temptations that can violate Weak Set Betweenness (which is implied by Temptation
Monotonicity), but satisfies Set Independence. The overlap with self-discipline
preferences is the multiple temptation model. Hence, each of these models overlap
with self-discipline preferences, neither one nesting the other.
In a discrete choice setting, Nehring [2006] proposes a model of preferences over
second-order preferences, where a DM exercises control over her future choice
dispositions. The interpretation of his model is similar to ours. However, we
consider a framework with menus of lotteries, and this extended setting is important
to interpret, characterize, and identify our self-discipline model.
Finally, self-discipline preferences share some common features with variational
preferences (first introduced in Maccheroni et al. [2006]). The closest model in the
menu-choice literature with a similar structure is the costly contemplation model
in Ergin and Sarver [2010]. Costly contemplation can also induce a desire for early
resolution of uncertainty, generating systematic violations of Set Independence.
However, costly contemplation preferences exhibit a desire for flexibility, and our
preferences satisfy this condition if and only if self-discipline is irrelevant (i.e., there
is no conflict between normative preferences and temptations).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
framework and formally define self-discipline preferences. Section 3 introduces our
axioms. In Section 4, we provide our main results: a representation theorem, identi-
fication result, and comparative statics. We also highlight some novel implications
of the self-discipline model for ex-post choice behavior. Section 5 concludes. Proofs
are given in a separate Appendix.
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2 Model
In this section, we describe our framework and formally define self-discipline
preferences.
2.1 Framework
In the following, X is a finite set of n alternatives, with typical elements x, y, z ∈ X
called outcomes; P is the set of all probability distributions on X, with typical
elements p, q, r ∈ P called lotteries; and A is the set of non-empty closed subsets
of P , with typical elements A,B,C ∈ A called menus.
Our primitive is a binary relation % on the set of menus, with asymmetric part
denoted  and symmetric part denoted ∼. We interpret the binary relation % as
the preference relation of a DM who chooses a menu in period 1, anticipating that
she will choose a lottery from the menu in period 2. We call the restriction of % to
singleton menus the commitment ranking. A functional U : A → R represents % if,
for all menus A and B,
A % B ⇔ U(A) ≥ U(B).
Let co(A) denote the convex hull of menu A; since the set of alternatives is finite
co(A) is also a menu.
For menus A,B ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], let
αA+ (1− α)B = {αp+ (1− α)q : p ∈ A, q ∈ B} .
The menu αA+ (1−α)B can be interpreted as a randomization over menus A and
B that is resolved after the DM has chosen a lottery, i.e., the DM chooses lottery
αp+ (1− α)q ∈ αA+ (1− α)B not knowing whether the lottery p ∈ A or q ∈ B
will determine her final outcome.
Given a binary relation % on menus, let A(p) = {q ∈ A : {q} ∼ {p}} denote
the intersection of menu A ∈ A and the “indifference curve” of the commitment
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ranking corresponding to lottery p ∈ P . If the commitment ranking is continuous,
A(p) is a menu whenever it is non-empty.
2.2 Temptations
For any two vectors v, w ∈ Rn, let v · w denote the dot product of v and w. An
expected utility function on P can be identified with an element of Rn; hence, if
v ∈ Rn and p ∈ P , we use v · p and v(p) interchangeably.
Let V = {v ∈ Rn : ∑ni=1 vi = 0, v · v = 1}, with typical elements u, v, w ∈ V called
(expected) utilities. For any non-constant w ∈ Rn, there exists a unique vw ∈ V
such that, for all p, q ∈ P , w(p) ≥ w(q) if and only if vw(p) ≥ vw(q). Hence, any
non-trivial expected utility preference on P can be represented by a unique utility
in V .
Let ∆(V) be the set of all finitely-additive Borel probability distributions on V,
with typical elements pi, ρ, µ ∈ ∆(V) called distributions (over temptations).2 For a
utility v ∈ V , denote by δv ∈ ∆(V) the distribution that assigns probability 1 to v.
For u ∈ V , define a partial order over V by v Cuw (read “v is closer to u than w”)
if, whenever u(p) > u(q),
w(p) ≥ w(q) ⇒ v(p) ≥ v(q).
Hence, the utility v is closer to u than w if, whenever w agrees with u, v also agrees
with u. A subset W ⊆ V is closed under Cu if w ∈ W and v Cuw implies v ∈ W .
Dekel and Lipman [2012] propose an extension of Cu from V to ∆(V), which formal-
izes the intuition that one distribution over temptations is more closely aligned (in a
stochastic sense) with specific utility u ∈ V than another distribution. Specifically,
define pi Du ρ (read “pi is stochastically closer to u than ρ”) if pi(W) ≥ ρ(W)
for every W ⊆ V that is (i) closed in V, and (ii) closed under Cu. Hence, the
distribution pi is stochastically closer to u than ρ if the utilities realized under pi
2In the literature, a distribution over temptations is also sometimes called a random utility. See,
e.g., Luce and Suppes [1965, Chapter 5.3] or Gul and Pesendorfer [2006] for detailed discussions.
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agree more often with u than the utilities realized under ρ.3
For menu A ∈ A and utility v ∈ V , let
Mv(A) = arg max
p∈A
v(p),
denote the set of lotteries in menu A that maximize the utility v. Since A is
non-empty and closed, and v is a continuous function on P , Mv(A) is also a menu
by the Maximum theorem.
For menu A ∈ A and utility u ∈ V , define the function ϕuA : V → R by
ϕuA(v) = max
p∈Mv(A)
u(p),
i.e., for any v ∈ V , ϕuA(v) is the maximum of u over Mv(A). Since u is a continuous
function on P and Mv(A) is a menu for all v ∈ V , ϕuA is well-defined.
2.3 Self-discipline
Dekel and Lipman [2012] propose a random Strotz model to describe the behavior
of a DM concerned about temptations:
Definition 1. [Random Strotz] A binary relation % on menus is a random Strotz
preference if there exists u ∈ V and pi ∈ ∆(V) such that the functional U : A → R,
defined by
U(A) =
ˆ
V
ϕuA(v) pi(dv),
represents %.
The random Strotz model can be interpreted as follows. The utility function u
represents the DM normative preference over lotteries, which reveals her long-term
goals and objectives (e.g., to lose weight, save for retirement, or gain a promotion).
However, when the DM chooses a lottery in the second period, she has temporary
preferences – temptations – that reveal her immediate desires, cravings and urges
3Dekel and Lipman [2012] give a number of equivalent definitions of the partial order Du,
which allow for a direct interpretation in terms of first order stochastic dominance.
7
(to eat a hamburger, purchase a new phone, or take an extended lunch break).
Temptations are overwhelming: if the DM’s temptation at the moment of choice is
represented by the utility v ∈ V, she is only able to choose one of the tempting
lotteries in Mv(A) from menu A. Until the moment of choice, the DM is uncertain
about the nature of the temptation that will strike. When uncertainty about
temptations is described by the distribution pi ∈ ∆(V), the DM prefers menu A
over menu B if and only if
ˆ
V
ϕuA(v) pi(dv) ≥
ˆ
V
ϕuB(v) pi(dv).
To formalize the idea that individuals exercise effort to regulate their own behavior,
we generalize the random Strotz model by viewing temptations as the endogenous
outcome of a self-discipline choice problem.
Our model formalizes the following idea. Temptations represent the DM immediate
desires, urges and cravings when she is called upon to choose a lottery. Until
the moment of choice, the DM is uncertain about the nature of temptations that
will strike. We view self-discipline as an effort the DM can exert to regulate her
own moods before a temptation is realized. By regulating her moods, the DM
reduces the chances that she will be struck by a temptation the leads her to make
normatively bad choices. For example, by suppressing her appetite, the dieter is
less likely to be struck by a temptation that leads her to overeat; by curbing her
mood to spend, the saver is less likely to be struck by a temptation that leads
her to overspend; and by overcoming her laziness, the careerist is less likely to be
struck by a temptation that leads her to shirk at work. However, self-discipline
can be hard, and so the DM must balance the benefits of regulating her moods
against the cost of self-discipline effort. These costs are represented by a function
c : ∆(V)→ R, where c(pi) is a behavioral measure of the effort required to induce
the distribution pi over temptations.
A self-discipline preference reflects the behavior of a DM who acts “as if” she
anticipates a costly self-discipline effort in the future:
Definition 2. [Self-discipline] A binary relation % on menus is a self-discipline
preference if there exists u ∈ V and a proper lower-semicontinuous function
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c : ∆(V)→ [0,∞] such that the functional U : A → R, defined by
U(A) = max
pi∈∆(V)
(ˆ
V
ϕuA(v)pi(dv)− c(pi)
)
, (1)
represents %. In this case, we say that % is represented by (u, c).
The self-discipline model admits a natural multi-system interpretation, in which the
utility u represents cognitive processes responsible for setting normative objectives
and regulating (at a cost) other cognitive processes responsible for desires, urges
and cravings. This approximates the way many psychologists view temptation
and self-control problems (see, e.g., Normann and Shallice [2000]). It also has
a connection with dual-self models studied in many applications, where one self
(the planner) is responsible for setting long-term goals and objectives, and can
control (at a cost) the behavior of another self (the doer) who executes short-term
decision-making (see, e.g., Thaler and Shefrin [1981], Bénabou and Tirole [2004],
Benhabib and Bisin [2005], Fudenberg and Levine [2006], and Ali [2011]).
Properness and lower-semicontinuity are minimal properties of a cost function to
ensure that the self-discipline choice problem is well-defined.4 We impose no other
a priori restrictions on the distribution over temptations that could be induced by
self-discipline effort. Instead, we assume that the DM anticipates her self-discipline
choice problem, and show that menu-choice reveals her self-discipline costs.
The following examples illustrate some special cases, which generalize existing mod-
els of temptation-driven behavior. Let % be a self-discipline preference represented
by (u, c).
Example 1. [Random Strotz] For some distribution over temptations pi ∈ ∆(V),
let c be defined on ∆(V) by
c(ρ) =
0 if ρ = pi∞ otherwise .
4The function c : ∆(V)→ [0,∞] is proper if c(pi) <∞ for some pi ∈ ∆(V). Lower semicontinuity
is defined with respect to the weak* topology.
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Then U(A) =
´
V ϕ
u
A(v) pi(dv) for all A ∈ A. Hence, random Strotz preferences
can be viewed as the special case of self-discipline preferences where there is a
common solution to the self-discipline choice problem for all menus (in this case,
the distribution pi). 
Example 2. [Costly Strotz] For some function k : V → [0,∞], which is proper
and lower semicontinuous, let c be defined on ∆(V) by c(pi) = ´V k(v)pi(dv). Then
U(A) = maxv∈V (ϕuA(v)− k(v)) for all A ∈ A. Costly Strotz preferences represent
the special case of our model where ex-post choice is non-stochastic. They can be
viewed as a generalization of the Strotz model in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001] where
– instead of a fixed temptation in period 2 – the DM can exercise self-discipline to
align her temptations more closely with her normative utility. 
Example 3. [Costly dual-self] For some v ∈ V and a proper lower-semicontinuous
function k : [0, 1]→ [0,∞], let c be defined on ∆(V) by
c(pi) =
k(β) if pi = βδu + (1− β)δv∞ otherwise .
Then U(A) = maxρ∈[0,1] (βϕuA(u) + (1− β)ϕuA(v)) for all A ∈ A. Costly dual-self
preferences represent a special case of our general model where self-discipline effort
is “one-dimensional”. They can be viewed as a generalization of the dual-self model
in Chatterjee and Krishna [2009] where – instead of a fixed chance that an “alter
ego” (utility function v) will select a lottery in period 2 – the DM can exercise
self-discipline to increase the chances that her normative utility u will prevail. 
3 Axioms
In this Section, we present our axioms. The first three axioms are standard:
Axiom 1. [Non-trivial Weak Order] For all menus A,B,C ∈ A, (i) A % B or
B % A, and (ii) A % B and B % C implies A % C. Moreover, there exist menus
A,B ∈ A such that A  B.
10
Axiom 2. [Mixture-Continuity] For all menus A,B,C ∈ A, the following sets are
closed:
{α ∈ [0, 1] : αA+ (1− α)B % C} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : C % αA+ (1− α)B} .
Axiom 3. [Indifference to Convexification] For all menus A ∈ A, A ∼ co(A).
Axiom 1 requires that the preference relation is complete, transitive, and non-trivial.
Axiom 2 imposes continuity for mixtures over menus. Axiom 3 follows from the
assumption that normative preferences and temptations satisfy the standard von
Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) axioms. As a result, the DM always chooses an
extreme point from a menu: since A and co(A) have the same extreme points,
A ∼ co(A). The remaining axioms identify distinctive features of self-discipline
and we discuss them in more detail.
3.1 Monotonicity
Our next axiom is a monotonicity condition based on comparing ex-post choices from
menus “temptation-by-temptation”. Suppose that for every temptation preference
v ∈ V, a lottery is tempting in A that is normatively preferred to every lottery
that is tempting in B (i.e., there exists p ∈ Mv(A) such that {p} % {q} for all
q ∈ Mv(B)). Then the DM could “replicate” the self-discipline effort she would
exert for menu B when she faces menu A, and guarantee a normatively better
outcome with menu A. Hence, she should prefer A to B.
The following definition formalizes the idea that menu A dominates menu B
“temptation-by-temptation”:
Definition 3. [Temptation dominance] Menu A temptation-dominates menu B
(denoted A D B) if, whenever {p}  {q},
1
2A(p) +
1
2B(q) ⊇
1
2B(p) +
1
2A(q).
To motivate the definition, suppose A D B. Now fix a specific temptation preference
v ∈ V, and suppose p is tempting in B, q is tempting in A, and {p}  {q}. Since
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{p}  {q}, A D B implies that there exists p′ ∈ A(p) and q′ ∈ B(q) such that
1
2p
′ + 12q
′ = 12p +
1
2q. Moreover, since temptations satisfy the standard vNM
independence axiom, 12p+
1
2q is tempting in
1
2A+
1
2B, and so
1
2p
′ + 12q
′ is tempting
in 12A +
1
2B. But this implies that p
′ is tempting in A (by vNM independence).
Hence, for any lottery that is tempting in menu B (e.g., p), there is normatively
better lottery that is tempting in A (e.g., p′). The same argument applies for every
temptation, and so the DM should prefer menu A to menu B:
Axiom 4. [Temptation Monotonicity] For all menus A,B ∈ A,
A D B ⇒ A % B.
3.2 Randomization
Our last two axioms reflect the idea that temptations are not necessarily fixed,
but are the endogenous outcome of a self-discipline choice problem. In particular,
the opportunity to adjust self-discipline effort in response to incentives induces a
desire for early resolution of uncertainty. To illustrate, consider an extension of the
DM’s preferences to lotteries over menus. In particular, for menus A,B ∈ A, let
α ◦ A+ (1− α) ◦B denote a randomization over menus A and B that is resolved
in period 1 (immediately after the DM has chosen a menu). By contrast, the
menu αA + (1 − α)B denotes a randomization over A and B that is resolved in
period 2 (immediately after the DM has chosen a lottery). When deciding how
much self-discipline to exercise, a DM may strictly prefer an early resolution of
uncertainty so that she can condition her self-discipline effort on the realization of
uncertainty:
Axiom 5. [Aversion to Randomization] For all menus A,B ∈ A, lotteries p, q ∈ P ,
and α ∈ (0, 1),
A ∼ {p} and B ∼ {q} ⇒ α{p}+ (1− α){q} % αA+ (1− α)B.
To motivate the axiom, suppose the DM is indifferent between menus A and
{p}, and between menus B and {q}. A standard independence argument would
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imply that the DM should also be indifferent between α ◦ {p} + (1 − α) ◦ {q}
and α ◦ A + (1 − α) ◦ B. However, the optimal self-discipline effort for menus
A and B may differ. Intuitively, the DM would like to make her choice of self-
discipline contingent on the menu that is actually payoff relevant, and so prefers
an early resolution of uncertainty when randomizing over menus A and B (i.e.,
α◦A+(1−α)◦B % αA+(1−α)B). On the other hand, self-discipline is redundant
for singleton menus, and so the timing of the resolution of uncertainty is irrelevant
for the singleton menus {p} and {q} (i.e., α◦{p}+(1−α)◦{q} ∼ α{p}+(1−α){q}).
Hence, α{p}+ (1− α){q} % αA+ (1− α)B is implied by a standard independence
argument together with a desire for early resolution of uncertainty for non-singleton
menus.
Our final axiom excludes intrinsic (psychological) motivations for an early resolution
of uncertainty, focusing the desire for early resolution on the role of self-discipline
effort:
Axiom 6. [Independence of Degenerate Decisions] For all menus A,B ∈ A,
lotteries p, q ∈ P , and α ∈ (0, 1),
αA+ (1− α){p} % αB + (1− α){p} ⇒ αA+ (1− α){q} % αB + (1− α){q}.
To motivate the axiom, suppose the DM prefers menu αA + (1 − α){p} to
αB+ (1−α){p}. While the incentives to exercise self-discipline in αA+ (1−α){p}
may depend on menu A and probability α, they are independent of the particular
lottery p because self-discipline is redundant for singleton menus (where the de-
cision is degenerate). Likewise, the incentives to exercise self-discipline in menu
αB + (1− α){p} depend only on B and α. As such, replacing singleton menu {p}
with menu {q} does not alter the incentives to exercise self-discipline. Since self-
discipline is the only reason the DM may prefer an early resolution of uncertainty,
the DM therefore also prefers αA+ (1− α){q} to αB + (1− α){q}.
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4 Analysis
In this section, we analyze the implications of the self-discipline model for menu-
choice.
4.1 Characterization
The following theorem shows that the axioms in Section 3 characterize the behavior
of a DM who chooses among menus “as if” she anticipates a self-discipline choice
problem:
Theorem 1. A binary relation on menus % is a self-discipline preference if and
only if it satisfies Axioms 1–6.
Proof sketch: It is straightforward to show that self-discipline preferences satisfy
Axioms 1–6. For the converse, we show in the proof of Theorem 1 that Axioms
1–2 and 6 imply that the commitment ranking can be represented by a utility
u ∈ V. Using singleton equivalents, we then define a functional I over the set
Φ = {ϕuA : A ∈ A} such that, for all menus A and B, A % B if and only if
I(ϕuA) ≥ I(ϕuB). The key step in the proof is to show that I is monotone, i.e.,
ϕuA ≥ ϕuB implies I(ϕuA) ≥ I(ϕuB). To establish this, we show in Lemma 1 that for
convex menus A and B, A D B if and only if ϕuA ≥ ϕuB. The monotonicity of I
then follows from Axioms 3 and 4. The remainder of the proof uses Axioms 5–6 to
show that I is a continuous convex functional, and applies a duality argument to
establish the desired representation. 
In addition to establishing testable implications of self-discipline, the characteri-
zation facilitates a comparison of self-discipline preferences with other models of
menu-choice.
Axioms 1–3 are satisfied by most models of menu-choice in a framework with
lotteries. Many models satisfy a stronger continuity condition introduced in Dekel
et al. [2001]:
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Axiom. [Strong Continuity] For all menus A ∈ A, the following sets are closed in
the Hausdorff topology:
{B ∈ A : B % A} and {B ∈ A : A % B} .
Strong Continuity is a technical condition, which implies Mixture Continuity.
However, Strong Continuity is inconsistent with some important special cases of
self-discipline preferences, such as the Strotz model in Gul and Pesendorfer [2001]
and the dual-self model in Chatterjee and Krishna [2009]. For a weak order that
satisfies Strong Continuity, Axiom 3 is implied by Set Independence (see definition
below); we require Indifference to Convexification explicitly because self-discipline
preferences can violate both Strong Continuity and Set Independence.
Axiom 4 reveals that our DM is concerned that she can be tempted by ex-ante
inferior alternatives in the second period. In particular, it implies the Weak Set
Betweenness axiom in Dekel et al. [2009]:
Axiom. [Weak Set Betweenness] For all menus A,B ∈ A, if {p} % {q} for all
p ∈ A and q ∈ B, then A % A ∪B % B.
It is straightforward to show that {p} % {q} for all p ∈ A and q ∈ B implies
A D A ∪B D B (in the sense of Definition 3). Following the discussion in Section
3.1, Weak Set Betweenness can therefore also be interpreted as a monotonicity
condition based on comparing menus “temptation-by-temptation”. However, the
logic behind Weak Set Betweenness uses only the assumption that temptations are
continuous weak orders.5 Temptation Monotonicity extends the set of menus that
are comparable by using the additional assumption that temptations satisfy the
standard vNM independence axiom (thereby strengthening the axiom).
Axiom 5 is related to the Aversion to Contingent Planning (ACP) axiom in Ergin
5To illustrate, suppose {p} % {q} for all p ∈ A and q ∈ B. Now fix a specific temptation
preference, and suppose p is tempting in A and q is tempting in B. Since we have fixed a
temptation preference, either p or q must be tempting in A ∪B. In either case, there is a lottery
that is tempting in A that is normatively preferred to the lottery that is tempting in A∪B, and a
lottery that is tempting in A∪B that is normatively preferred to the lottery that is tempting in B.
The same argument applies for any temptation preference that is representable by a continuous
utility function (regardless of whether the temptation satisfies vNM independence or not).
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and Sarver [2010], who also introduce Axiom 6 in the context of their costly contem-
plation model. For a weak order, Aversion to Randomization implies ACP if every
menu has a singleton equivalent, while ACP implies Aversion to Randomization
if preferences satisfy Strong Continuity. However, singleton equivalents may fail
to exist for the costly contemplation preferences in Ergin and Sarver [2010], while
self-discipline preferences can violate Strong Continuity. Aversion to Randomization
and ACP are therefore not interchangeable.
Together, Axioms 5 and 6 reveal the systematic violations of the Set Independence
axiom in Dekel et al. [2001] induced by a self-discipline choice problem:
Axiom. [Set Independence] For all menus A,B,C ∈ A and α ∈ (0, 1),
A % B ⇒ αA+ (1− α)C % αB + (1− α)C.
Set Independence can be viewed as combining a standard independence argument –
A % B implies α ◦A+ (1− α) ◦C % α ◦B + (1− α) ◦C – with indifference to the
timing of the resolution of uncertainty – α ◦A+ (1−α)◦C ∼ αA+ (1−α)C – (see,
e.g., Gul and Pesendorfer [2001, p. 1407]). The standard independence condition
seems compelling, but indifference to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty is
less compelling when there are hidden actions available to a DM (see, e.g., Kreps
and Porteus [1978], and Machina [1984]). Self-discipline effort is a specific example
of a hidden action, which induces violations of Set Independence in our framework.
In particular, a self-discipline preference will satisfy Set Independence if and only
if there is a common self-discipline effort that is optimal for every menu:
Proposition 1. Let % be a self-discipline preference. Then % is a random Strotz
preference if and only if it satisfies the Set Independence axiom.
Dekel and Lipman [2012] characterize the class of continuous-intensity random
Strotz preferences. Proposition 1 complements their result with an axiomatic char-
acterization of random Strotz preferences without additional continuity conditions,
also providing a novel interpretation of the random Strotz model as the special case
of self-discipline where the self-discipline choice problem has a common solution
for all menus.
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4.2 Identification
Our next result shows how self-discipline costs can be recovered from menu-choice
data. The normative utility is identified uniquely from the DM’s commitment
ranking. However, it is generally not possible to identify a unique cost function.
To see why, consider a self-discipline preference % represented by (u, c), and let
D(A|u, c) = arg max
pi∈∆(V)
[ˆ
V
ϕA(v) pi(dv)− c(pi)
]
denote the set of optimal distributions for the self-discipline choice problem with
menu A. Now suppose c(pi) < ∞ for some pi /∈ ⋃A∈AD(A|u, c). Define another
cost function c˜ such that c˜(pi) > c(pi) and c˜(ρ) = c(ρ) for all ρ 6= pi. Then clearly
(u, c˜) also represents %. Hence, it is not possible to identify a unique cost for a
distribution that is never optimal. However, the following theorem shows that there
is a unique minimal cost function. We observe that, for a self-discipline preference
%, every menu A ∈ A has a singleton equivalent pA ∈ P such that {pA} ∼ A.
Theorem 2. Let % be a self-discipline preference represented by (u, c). Then:
(i) The utility u is the unique function in V such that, for all p, q ∈ P ,
{p} % {q} ⇔ u(p) ≥ u(q).
(ii) The function c∗ : ∆(V)→ [0,∞], defined by
c∗(pi) = sup
A∈A
(ˆ
V
ϕA(v)pi(dv)− u(pA)
)
∀pi ∈ ∆(V), (2)
is the unique minimal self-discipline cost function such that (u, c∗) represents
%.
Theorem 2 shows how the parameters of a self-discipline model can be elicited from
menu-choice data. First, the normative utility u can be recovered directly from the
commitment ranking. Second, the cost function c∗ can be constructed from data
on singleton equivalents. For instance, suppose we want to determine the cost of
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pi ∈ ∆(V) using experimental data. For any menu A, c∗(pi) ≥ ´ ϕA(v) pi(dv)−u(pA),
where pA is the singleton equivalent of A. This provides a lower bound on the
self-discipline cost of pi. Data on singleton equivalents for other menus allows us
to estimate a more precise lower bound. The formula in Eq. (2) shows that this
procedure approximates c∗(pi) arbitrarily closely, establishing a direct connection
between the self-discipline cost function and menu-choice behavior.
For the menu-choice implications of the self-discipline model, Theorem 2 shows
that it is without loss of generality to consider only the minimal cost function c∗.
The following corollary shows that cost function c∗ also measures the cost of any
feasible self-discipline effort.
Corollary 1. Suppose the self-discipline preference % has canonical representation
(u, c∗), and let c be another cost function such that (u, c) also represents %. Then:
(i) pi ∈ ⋃A∈AD(A|u, c) implies c(pi) = c∗(pi), and
(ii) D(A|u, c) ⊆ D(A|u, c∗) for all A ∈ A.
The DM therefore never exercise a self-discipline effort that would be suboptimal
with the minimal cost function, and the cost of any self-discipline effort the DM
anticipates exercising is equal to the minimal cost. As a result, we refer to c∗ as
the canonical cost function, and call (u, c∗) the canonical representation of %. The
following Proposition shows that the canonical cost function also satisfies some
properties that seem intuitive for a measure of self-discipline costs:
Proposition 2. Let % be a self-discipline preference with the canonical represen-
tation (u, c∗). Then c∗ satisfies the following properties:
(i) Groundedness: c∗(pi) = 0 for some pi ∈ ∆(V).
(ii) Convexity: c∗(αpi+ (1−α)ρ) ≤ αc∗(pi) + (1−α)c∗(ρ) for all pi, ρ ∈ ∆(V) and
α ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) Monotonicity: pi Du ρ implies c∗(pi) ≥ c∗(ρ).
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Groundedness means that the DM has the option to exercise no self-discipline effort,
thereby incurring no cost. In particular, a distribution pi with c∗(pi) = 0 can be
interpreted as a distribution over temptations the DM can achieve without any self-
discipline effort. Convexity means that the DM can randomize over self-discipline
effort. For example, to induce the distribution αpi + (1− α)ρ the DM could plan
to toss a biased coin, exercising the self-discipline needed to induce pi when the
coin lands on heads and the self-discipline need to induce ρ when the coin lands on
tails. The cost of αpi + (1− α)ρ should then be bounded above by the expected
cost of the randomization (i.e., αc(pi) + (1− α)c(ρ)); the inequality being strict if
there is an alternative, less costly self-discipline effort that would also achieve the
distribution αpi + (1− α)ρ over temptations (without randomizing over pi and ρ).
Finally, monotonicity captures the intuitive idea that aligning temptations closer
with her normative utility requires more self-discipline, and should therefore be
costlier.
Example 4. [Costly dual-self (cont.)] To illustrate, consider the costly dual-self
preference in Example 3. It is straightforward to see that the cost function c
is grounded if and only if k is grounded; convex if and only if k is convex; and
monotone if and only if k is increasing. Hence, Proposition 2 shows that it is
without loss of generality to assume (i) the DM incurs no cost when the “alter ego”
(utility v) selects a lottery for sure (k(0) = 0), (ii) the DM incurs a higher cost to
increase the chances that her normative utility will prevail (k(β) is increasing in
β), and (iii) the “marginal cost” of self-discipline is increasing (k is convex). 
4.3 Comparative statics
As an application of the identification result in Theorem 2, we provide a behavioral
measure of comparative self-discipline. Consider two DMs with self-discipline
preferences %1 and %2. Intuitively, if self-discipline is costlier for DM2 than for
DM1, DM2 should find commitment – which eliminates the need to exercise self-
discipline – more valuable. Dekel and Lipman [2012] define a comparative behavior
that formalizes when DM2 finds commitment more valuable than DM1 in terms of
menu-choice data:
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Definition 4. [Desire for commitment] Let %1 and %2 be binary relations on the
set of menus A. Then %2 has a stronger desire for commitment than %1 if, for all
menus A and lotteries p,
{p} %1 A ⇒ {p} %2 A.
The following theorem shows that, in the context of the self-discipline model, this
comparative characterizes when one DM has a higher cost of self-discipline than
the other:
Theorem 3. Let %1 and %2 be self-discipline preferences with canonical represen-
tations (u1, c1) and (u2, c2), respectively. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) %2 has a stronger desire for commitment than %1.
(ii) u2 = u1 and c2 ≥ c1.
Theorem 3 shows that a DM with higher costs of self-discipline values commitment
more than an agent with lower self-discipline costs, establishing a comparative
measure of self-discipline in terms of behavioral data.6
4.4 Ex-post choice
We conclude by highlighting some implications of self-discipline for ex-post choices
from menus. To simplify, consider the costly Strotz model in Example 2, which is
the special case of self-discipline that induces non-stochastic ex-post choice behavior.
Specifically, for a costly Strotz preference represented by (u, k), let C : A → A,
defined by
C(A) = ⋃
v∈D(A|u,k)
arg max
p∈Mv(A)
u(p) ∀A ∈ A,
denote the ex-post choice correspondence on menus induced by (u, k). Recall that a
choice correspondence C on menus satisfies the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
6The restriction that u2 = u1 is required to compare the canonical costs, as these costs are
measured in the same units as the normative utility.
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(WARP) if
p, q ∈ A ∪B, p ∈ C(A), q ∈ C(B) ⇒ p ∈ C(B)
and vNM independence (IND) if
C(αA+ (1− α)B) = αC(A) + (1− α)C(B) ∀A,B ∈ A and α ∈ (0, 1).
The following examples illustrate that the ex-post choices induced by costly Strotz
model can violate WARP and IND.
Example 5. [WARP] Consider three utilities u,w, w˜ ∈ V , where u represents the
DM’s normative ranking, and define the self-discipline cost function k by
k(v) =
0 if v ∈ {w, w˜}∞ otherwise ,
Now consider three lotteries p, q, r ∈ P such that u(p) > u(q) > u(r), while
w(r) > w(p) > w(q) and w˜(q) > w˜(r) > w˜(p).
In menu {p, q}, w solves the self-discipline choice problem, while in the menu
{p, q, r}, w˜ solves the self-discipline choice problem. Hence, C({p, q}) = {p} but
C({p, q, r}) = {q}, violating WARP. 
Example 5 illustrates that the costly Strotz model is consistent with well-known
violations of WARP (see, e.g., Sippel [1997], or Echenique et al. [2011]).7 The
following example illustrates that the model can also induce violations of IND
consistent, for example, with the common ratio effect observed in Allais [1953] and
Kahneman and Tversky [1979]:8
Example 6. [Independence] Consider the same setting as Example 5, but define
7In a discrete-choice framework, a related example is discussed in Nehring [2006].
8Let [α;x] denote a lottery in which the DM receives $x with probability α, and $0 otherwise,
and let p = [1; 3000], q = [ 45 ; 4000], and z = [1; 0]. The common ratio effect is the finding
that many subjects in experiments choose p from {p, q}, but also choose 0.25q + 0.75z from
{0.25p+ 0.75q, 0.25q + 0.75z}, consistent with the period 2 behavior in Example 6.
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the self-discipline cost function k by
k(v) =

0 if v = w
1
2 (u(p)− u(q)) if v = u
∞ otherwise
.
In menu {p, q}, u solves the self-discipline choice problem, while w solves the
self-discipline choice problem in menu 14{p, q}+ 34{r}. Hence, C({p, q}) = {p} but
we have C
(
1
4{p, q}+ 34{r}
)
=
{
1
4q +
3
4r
}
, violating IND. 
The examples illustrate that the costly Strotz model can provide a simple temptation-
driven explanation for well-documented deviations from standard rationality pos-
tulates. The following proposition shows that these features of ex-post choice are
directly related to violations of Set Independence for preferences over menus.
Proposition 3. Let % be a costly Strotz preference that induces the choice cor-
respondence C. Then C satisfies WARP and IND if and only if % satisfies Set
Independence.
The idea that temptations can induce violations of WARP and IND has been
observed before. For instance, the convex self-control model in Noor and Takeoka
[2010] can induce ex-post violations of WARP and IND. However, the overlap
of costly Strotz and convex self-control preferences satisfies Set Independence.
Proposition 3 therefore illustrates that the endogenous choice of temptations in the
costly Strotz model induces a novel source of deviations from WARP and IND. For
instance, in Noor and Takeoka’s [2010] example of the common ratio effect, the
normative utility must exhibit more risk aversion than the temptation utility; while
in Example 6 the normative utility exhibits less risk aversion than the temptation
utility. Hence, the common ratio effect arises in their model when a DM controls
her urge to avoid risks, while in our model the common ratio effect arises because
the DM regulates her urge to seek risks.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a model of temptation-driven behavior, in which an
agent can exercise costly self-discipline to align her temptations more closely with
her normative objectives. In a menu-choice framework, we provide an axiomatic
characterization that establishes testable implications of self-discipline. We also
show that self-discipline cost can be elicited from choice-data, and provide a
behavioral measure of comparative self-discipline.
Self-discipline preferences generalize many well-known models of temptation-driven
behavior, such as the random Strotz, self-control, and multiple temptation models.
Moreover, by incorporating incentive effects that impact a decision-maker’s self-
discipline choice problem, the model can accommodate novel behavioral implications
of temptation and self-control problems. For example, in period 1, self-discipline
induces a desire for early resolution of uncertainty, generating violations of Set
Independence. In period 2, self-discipline induces menu-dependent temptation
rankings, generating commonly observed violations of standard rationality postu-
lates such as WARP and IND. The self-discipline model is therefore sufficiently
general to rationalize a wide-range of temptation-driven behaviors, while having
enough structure to identify behavioral meaningful parameters from choice-data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Preliminaries
Let B(Σ) be the set of bounded Σ-measurable functions mapping V to R. When
endowed with the supnorm, B(Σ) is a Banach space. The topological dual of B(Σ)
is the space ba(Σ) of all bounded and finitely-additive set functions µ : Σ→ R, the
duality being
〈ϕ, µ〉 =
ˆ
V
ϕ(v)µ(dv)
for all ϕ ∈ B(Σ) and all µ ∈ ba(Σ) (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz [1958, p. 258]).
For ϕ, ψ ∈ B(Σ), we write ϕ ≥ ψ if ϕ(v) ≥ ψ(v) for all v ∈ V .
Let Φ be a non-empty subset of B(Σ), and Φc be the constant functions in Φ. Set
Φ is called a tube if Φ = Φ + R. A functional I : Φ→ R is
(i) normalized if I(k) = k for all k ∈ Φc,9
(ii) monotone if ϕ ≥ ψ implies I(ϕ) ≥ I(ψ) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ,
(iii) translation invariant if I(αϕ+ (1− α)k) = I(αϕ) + (1− α)k for all ϕ ∈ Φ,
k ∈ Φc, and α ∈ [0, 1], such that αϕ, αϕ+ (1− α)k ∈ Φ,
9We abuse notation by writing k for k1, where it is obvious from the context.
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(iv) vertically invariant if I(ϕ+ c) = I(ϕ) + c for all ϕ ∈ Φ and c ∈ R such that
ϕ+ c ∈ Φ,
(v) a niveloid if I(ϕ)− I(ψ) ≤ sup
v∈V
(ϕ(v)− ψ(v)) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ.
For notational convenience, we denote αA+ (1− α)B by A[α]B for A,B ∈ A and
α ∈ [0, 1].
Let P o be the interior of P (i.e., the set of lotteries with full support), and Ao ⊂ A
the collection of non-empty closed subsets of P o. Denote by p¯ = (1/n, ..., 1/n) the
uniform distribution over X.
For u ∈ V and A ∈ A, define ϕuA : V → R by
ϕuA(v) = max
p∈Mv(A)
u(p) ∀v ∈ V . (3)
When u is clear from the context, we omit the superscript u. By the Maximum
Theorem (see, e.g., Aliprantis and Border [2006, pp. 569–570]), ϕA is an upper
semicontinuous function taking values in K = [u∗, u∗], where u∗ = min
p∈P
u(p) and
u∗ = max
p∈P
u(p). Upper semicontinuous functions are Σ-measurable (Billingsley [1995,
pp. 184–186]). As a result, ϕA ∈ B(Σ, K), where B(Σ, K) denotes the functions
in B(Σ) assuming values in K. Let Φ = {ϕA : A ∈ A} and Φo = {ϕA : A ∈ Ao}.
Clearly 0 ∈ Φo and Φo ⊆ Φ. Moreover, since ϕA[α]B = αϕA + (1 − α)ϕB for any
A,B ∈ A and α ∈ [0, 1], both Φ and Φo are convex sets. It is straightforward to
show thatϕA = ϕco(A) for all A ∈ A.
A.2 Lemmas
In this Section, we state and prove three lemmas that are essential to establish
our results. The first lemma characterizes an important dominance relation on
menus. The second lemma provides a representation for a binary relation satisfying
Axioms 1–4. The third lemma establishes that there is a common solution to the
self-discipline choice problem for a collection of menus if and only if the DM is
indifferent to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty for these menus.
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A.2.1 A dominance relation on menus
In the following, fix some u ∈ V .
For A ∈ A and p, q ∈ P such that u(p) ≥ u(q), let Ap = {r ∈ co(A) : u(r) = u(p)}
and Ap,q = {r ∈ co(A) : u(p) ≥ u(r) ≥ u(q)}. Now define a partial order D∗u on A
by A D∗u B if
u(p) > u(q) ⇒ Ap[12]Bq ⊇ Bp[
1
2]Aq.
There is a “duality” between the order Du on ∆(V) and the order D∗u on A:
(i) For pi, ρ ∈ ∆(V), pi Du ρ if and only if 〈ϕA, pi〉 ≥ 〈ϕA, ρ〉 for all A ∈ A.
(ii) For A,B ∈ A, A D∗u B if and only if 〈ϕA, pi〉 ≥ 〈ϕB, pi〉 for all pi ∈ ∆(V).
Part (i) follows from Theorem 4 and Lemma 6 in Dekel and Lipman [2012]. Part
(ii) follows directly from the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For all A,B ∈ A, A D∗u B if and only if ϕA ≥ ϕB.
Proof. [Sufficiency]: Let A,B ∈ A such that A D∗u B.
First, suppose A = Ap ∪ Aq and B = Bp ∪ Bq for two lotteries p, q ∈ P with
u(p) > u(q), where Ap, Aq, Bp and Bq are non-empty. Fix any v ∈ V, and let
r ∈Mv(Ap), r′ ∈Mv(Aq), s ∈Mv(Bp), and s′ ∈Mv(Bq). Since Ap[12 ]Bq ⊇ Bp[12 ]Aq,
1
2v(r) +
1
2v(s
′) ≥ 12v(s) + 12v(r′), and so v(r) − v(r′) ≥ v(s) − v(s′). Hence,
ϕA(v) ≥ ϕB(v). Since v was arbitrary, ϕA ≥ ϕB.
Now consider arbitrary A,B ∈ A. Fix v ∈ V , and let r ∈ arg maxp∈Mv(A) u(p) and
s ∈Mv(B). By way of contradiction, suppose u(s) > u(r). ThenAs[12 ]Br ⊇ Bs[12 ]Ar.
Since r ∈ Ar and s ∈ Bs, both of these sets are non-empty. SinceAs[12 ]Br ⊇ Bs[12 ]Ar,
it follows that As and Br are non-empty. Hence, by the argument in the previous
paragraph, ϕAs∪Ar ≥ ϕBs∪Br , and so there exists s′ ∈Mv(As ∪ Ar) ∩ As, implying
s′ ∈ Mv(co(A)). Since u(s′) > u(r), this contradicts r ∈ arg maxp∈Mv(A) u(p).
Hence, ϕA ≥ ϕB.
[Necessity]: Let A,B ∈ A such that ϕA ≥ ϕB.
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Let p, q ∈ P such that u(p) > u(q). The following steps show Ap[12 ]Bq ⊇ Bp[12 ]Aq.
Step 1: If u(wA) = min
r∈A
u(r) ≥ max
s∈B
u(s) = u(bB), then the claim is trivially
true. Thus, assume that u(bB) > u(wA). Since u,−u ∈ V, we must have
u(bA) = max
r∈A
u(r) ≥ u(bB) and u(wA) ≥ min
s∈B
u(s) = u(wB), and so if u(p) > u(bB)
or u(wA) > u(q), the claim holds easily. Hence, assume u(bB) ≥ u(p) > u(q) ≥ u(wA).
Step 2: We now argue that ϕAp,q ≥ ϕBp,q . To see this, let v ∈ V such that
ϕB(v) = u(r) for some r ∈ Mv(B). First, if u(r) > u(p), then for any s ∈ co(B)
with u(p) > u(s), there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying αr+ (1−α)s ∈ Bp. Hence,
v · [αr+(1−α)s] ≥ v ·s implyingMv(Bp,q) ⊂ Bp. The same argument applies for A
yielding Mv(Ap,q) ⊆ Ap, and so ϕAp,q(v) = ϕBp,q(v). Second, if u(p) ≥ u(r) ≥ u(q),
then clearly ϕBp,q(v) = ϕB(v) and ϕAp,q(v) = ϕA(v), and so ϕAp,q(v) ≥ ϕBp,q(v)
since we have ϕA ≥ ϕB. Finally, if u(q) > u(r), then for any s ∈ B with u(s) > u(q),
there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying αr + (1− α)s ∈ Bq. Hence, for any s ∈ B
with u(s) > u(q), v · [αr + (1 − α)s] ≥ v · s implying Mv(Bp,q) ⊂ Bq and so
ϕAp,q(v) ≥ ϕBp,q(v). Thus, we have ϕAp,q ≥ ϕBp,q .
Step 3: We now show that ϕAp∪Aq ≥ ϕBp∪Bq . Fix some w ∈ W = {v ∈ V : v·u = 0}
and notice that there is a unique α¯ ∈ (−1, 1) such that v¯ = α¯u+
(√
1− α¯2
)
w ∈ V
satisfies Mv¯(Ap∪Aq) = Mw(Ap)∪Mw(Aq). That is, v¯(r) = v¯(s) for all r ∈Mw(Ap)
and s ∈Mw(Aq). We claim that Mv¯(Bp ∪Bq) ∩Mw(Bq) 6= ∅. That is, v¯(r) ≤ v¯(s)
for all r ∈ Mw(Bp) and s ∈ Mw(Bq). Assume, for contradiction, that this is
not true. For any r ∈ P , let rw,u = (u · r) · u + (w · r) · w ∈ Rn denote the
projection of r onto the space spanned by u and w in Rn. Note that for any E ∈ A
and r ∈ P , all points in Mw(Er) are projected onto the same point rEw,u ∈ Rn.
Let Mw,u(Er) = {rEw,u ∈ Rn} and let Mw,u(Es,t) =
⋃
u(s)≥u(r)≥u(t)
Mw,u(Er) for any
E ∈ A and s, t ∈ P . Note that by assumption we have v¯(pBw,u) > v¯(qBw,u) and
v¯(pAw,u) = v¯(qAw,u). Now, without loss of generality, assume that
v¯(pBw,u) > v¯(pAw,u) = v¯(qAw,u) > v¯(qBw,u)
Define a function f : [0, 1] → R such that f(a) = w(r[a]Aw,u) − w(r[a]Bw,u) where
r[a] = ap+ (1− a)q ∈ P for all a ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that f is a continuous function
from [0, 1] into R such that f(0) > 0 and f(1) < 0. Hence, by the Intermediate
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Value Theorem, there is some a ∈ (0, 1) satisfying f(a) = 0. That is, there is
some a ∈ (0, 1) such that w(r[a]Aw,u) − w(r[a]Bw,u) = 0 implying r[a]Aw,u = r[a]Bw,u.
Therefore, the set F = Mw,u(Ap,q) ∩Mw,u(Bp,q) is non-empty. Moreover, it can be
easily verified that F is a closed (and convex) set. Let r[a∗] be the unique element
of Mu(F ). Note that a∗ ∈ (0, 1); that is, u(p) > u(r[a∗]) > u(q) since pAw,u 6= pBw,u
and qAw,u 6= qBw,u.
For all a ∈ (a∗, 1], let αA(a) ∈ (−1, 1) be the unique number such that the vector
vAa = αA(a)u +
(√
1− (αA(a))2
)
w ∈ V satisfies vAa (r[a∗]) = vAa (r[a]Aw,u). Note
that αA(a) is a monotonically decreasing upper semicontinuous function. Hence
α∗A = lima→a∗α
A(a) is well defined. Similarly, for all a ∈ (a∗, 1] let αB(a) ∈ (−1, 1)
such that vBa = αB(a)u+
(√
1− (αB(a))2
)
w ∈ V satisfies vBa (r[a∗]) = vBa (r[a]Bw,u)
and define α∗B = lima→a∗α
B(a). Observe that it must be −1 < α∗B ≤ α∗A < 1. Moreover
since r[a∗] is the unique element ofMu(F ), without loss of generality, we can assume
that α∗B < α∗A.
Pick some αˆ ∈ (α∗B, α∗A) and let vˆ = αˆu +
(√
1− αˆ2
)
w ∈ V. Note that since
α∗B < αˆ and αB(a) is decreasing, there must be some rˆB ∈ Mvˆ(Mw,u(Bp,q)) such
that u(rˆB) > u(r[a∗]). Moreover, since αˆ < α∗A ≤ αA(a) for all a ∈ (a∗, 1], we
have u(r[a∗]) ≥ u(rˆA) for all rˆA ∈ Mvˆ(Mw,u(Ap,q)). Combining these, we deduce
ϕAp,q(vˆ) < ϕBp,q(vˆ), a contradiction. Hence, it must be Mv¯(Bp ∪Bq)∩Mw(Bq) 6= ∅.
Note that any v ∈ V\{u,−u} can be uniquely given as v = vαu,w = αu+
(√
1− α2
)
w
for some w ∈ W and some α ∈ (−1, 1). Moreover, for any E ∈ A, and for any
vαu,w, v
β
u,w ∈ V with w ∈ W and α, β ∈ (−1, 1), we haveMvαu,w(Es∪Et)∩Mw(Et) = ∅
impliesMvβu,w(Es∪Et)∩Mw(Et) = ∅ whenever s, t ∈ P with u(s) > u(t) and α < β.
Therefore, given thatMv¯(Ap∪Aq)∩Mw(Aq) 6= ∅ impliesMv¯(Bp∪Bq)∩Mw(Bq) 6= ∅,
for any v = αu +
(√
1− α2
)
w ∈ V with w ∈ W and α ∈ (−1, 1), we must have
Mv(Bp ∪Bq) ∩Mw(Bq) = ∅ implies Mv(Ap ∪ Aq) ∩Mw(Aq) = ∅. Thus, we obtain
ϕAp∪Aq ≥ ϕBp∪Bq .
Step 4: Finally let r¯ = 12p +
1
2q, and let Cr¯ = Ap[
1
2 ]Bq, Cq = Aq[
1
2 ]Bq, and
Dr¯ = Aq[12 ]Bp. We want to show that Cr¯ ⊇ Dr¯. Note that since ϕAp∪Aq ≥ ϕBp∪Bq
we have ϕCr¯∪Cq = 12ϕAp∪Aq +
1
2ϕBq ≥ ϕBp∪Bq + 12ϕAq = ϕDr¯∪Cq . Assume for
contradiction that there exists some s ∈ Dr¯ \ Cr¯. Then Cr¯ and E = co({s} ∪ Cq)
are both closed and convex sets in Rn with Cr¯ ∩ E = ∅. Hence, by a Strong
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Separating Hyperplane Theorem (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz [1958, p. 417] or
Aliprantis and Border [2006, p. 207]), there exists some v ∈ V and k ∈ R such that
v · e > k for all e ∈ E and v · f < k for all f ∈ Cr¯. If v · s ≥ v · e for all e ∈ Cq, then
we must have ϕDr¯∪Cq(v) = u · s > u · q = ϕDr¯∪Cq(v), a contradiction. Thus, assume
that we have max
e∈Cq
v · e > v · s and let c ∈ Cq such that v · c ≥ v · e for all e ∈ Cq.
Now define α = u·s−u·c(v·c−v·s)+(u·s−u·c) ∈ (0, 1) and w = αv + (1 − α)u. Then we have
w·s = w·c ≥ w·e for all e ∈ Cq. On the other hand, w·c = w·s > w·f for all f ∈ Cr¯.
Thus, we must have ϕDr¯∪Cq(vw) = u · s > u · q = ϕDr¯∪Cq(vw), a contradiction. To
summarize, there cannot be any s ∈ Dr¯ \ Cr¯, and so Ap[12 ]Bq ⊇ Bp[12 ]Aq.
A.2.2 Implications of Axioms 1–4
The following lemma shows how the self-discipline representation is obtained from
Axioms 1–6.
Lemma 2. Let % be a binary relation on A that satisfies Axioms 1–6. Then:
(i) There exists u ∈ V such that, for all p, q ∈ P , u(p) ≥ u(q) if and only if
{p} % {q}.
(ii) Every menu A ∈ A has a singleton equivalent pA ∈ P .
(iii) The function c∗ defined on ∆(V) by
c∗(pi) = sup
A∈A
(〈ϕuA, pi〉 − u(pA)) ∀pi ∈ ∆(V)
is non-negative lower-semicontinuous and proper.
(iv) The functional U : A → R, defined by
U(A) = max
pi∈∆(V)
(〈ϕuA, pi〉 − c∗(pi)) ∀A ∈ A,
represents %.
Proof. Let % be a binary relation on A that satisfies Axioms 1–6.
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[Part (i)]: Let p, q ∈ P and assume that {p} ∼ {q}. By Axiom 5, we have
{p} % {q}[12 ]{p}. This implies {q}[12 ]{p} % {q} by Axiom 6, and so we must
have {p} ∼ {q}[12 ]{p}. By Axiom 6 again, we have {p}[12 ]{r} ∼ {q}[12 ]{r} for any
r ∈ P . Hence, by Herstein and Milnor [1953], there exists u ∈ V representing the
commitment ranking.
[Part (ii)]: Since A is non-empty and compact, and u is a continuous function
on P , there exist some b, w ∈ A such that {b} % {p} % {w} for all p ∈ A. Clearly
{b} % A % {w} by Axiom 4, and so by Axiom 2, the following (non-empty) sets,
whose union is equal to [0, 1], must be closed:
{α ∈ [0, 1] : {b}[α]{w} % A} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : A % {b}[α]{w}} .
Since [0, 1] is a connected set, the two subsets above must intersect; that is, there
must exist some α ∈ [0, 1] such that A ∼ {b}[α]{w}. Let pA ∈ P be equal to
αb+ (1− α)w. Finally, note that if A ∈ Ao, then b, w ∈ P o, and so pA ∈ P o.
[Part (iii)]: For any pi ∈ ∆(V),
〈
ϕ{p}, pi
〉
− u(p) = u(p) − u(p) = 0, and so c∗
is non-negative. Since c∗ is the supremum of continuous functions, it is lower
semicontinuous. Finally, for any A ∈ A, 〈ϕA, δ−u〉 = u(wA). Since u(r) % u(wA)
for all r ∈ A, it follows that Ap[12 ]{wA}q ⊇ {wA}p[12 ]Aq for all p, q ∈ P such that
{p}  {q}. To see why, note that {wA}p 6= ∅ if and only if {p} ∼ {wA}, but then
Aq = ∅. Hence, by Axiom 4, A % {wA} and so u(pA) ≥ u(wA). It follows that
〈ϕA, δ−u〉 − u(pA) ≤ 0 for all A ∈ A, and so c∗(δ−u) = 0. Hence, c∗ is proper.
[Part (iv)]: To establish the desired representation, we show that there is a normal-
ized convex niveloid I : Φ→ R such that, for all menus A and B, A % B if and only
if I(ϕA) ≥ I(ϕB). Following the approach in Maccheroni et al. [2006], an application
of Fenchel-Moreau duality then establishes I(ϕA) = maxpi∈∆(V) (〈ϕA, pi〉 − c∗(pi))
for all A ∈ A. The key step in the proof is establishing the functional I which
satisfies the prerequisite properties. For technical reasons, we start by defining a
functional Io on Ao, and then use Axiom 2 to extend the functional to A.
Define the functional Io : Φo → R by Io(ϕA) = u(pA) for all A ∈ A. If pA and qA
are two singleton equivalents of A, then u(pA) = u(qA). Hence, Io is well-defined.
Moreover, for any menus A,B ∈ Ao with singleton equivalents pA and pB, A % B
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if and only if {pA} % {pB} if and only if u(pA) ≥ u(pB). Hence, Io(ϕA) ≥ Io(ϕB)
if and only if A % B.
We start by establishing that Io is a normalize convex niveloid. We proceed in
steps. Step 1 shows that Io is normalized. Step 2 uses Axiom 5 to show Io is
convex. Step 3 uses Axiom 6 to show Io is translation invariant. Step 4 uses a
result in Maccheroni et al. [2004] to show that Io is vertically invariant. Step 5 uses
Axioms 4 and 3, and Lemma 1 to show that Io is monotone. Finally, Step 6 applies
a number of results in Maccheroni et al. [2004] to establish that Io is a niveloid.
Step 1: Io is normalized.
Let k ∈ R such that k ∈ Φo. That means there is a lottery p ∈ P o such that
k = ϕ{p} = u(p). Hence, Io(k) = Io(ϕ{p}) = u(p) = k.
Step 2: Io is convex.
Let A,B ∈ Ao and α ∈ [0, 1]. Note that A[α]B ∈ Ao and so ϕA[α]B ∈ Φo. By part
(ii) there exist some pA, pB ∈ P o such that {pA} ∼ A and {pB} ∼ B. By Axiom 5,
we have {pA}[α]{pB} % A[α]B, and so
αIo(ϕA) + (1− α)Io(ϕB) = αu(pA) + (1− α)u(pB)
= Io(ϕ{pA}[α]{pB})
≥ Io(ϕA[α]B)
= Io(αϕA + (1− α)ϕB).
Step 3: Io is translation invariant.
Let A ∈ Ao, p ∈ P with u(p) = k, and α ∈ (0, 1). Let b, w ∈ A such that
{b} % {q} % {w} for all q ∈ A. By part (i), {b}[α]{p¯} % {q}[α]{p¯} % {w}[α]{p¯}
for all q ∈ A, and so by Axiom 4 {b}[α]{p¯} % A[α]{p¯} % {w}[α]{p¯}. The argument
used in the proof of Claim part (ii) yields a β ∈ [0, 1] such that
({b}[α]{p¯}) [β] ({w}[α]{p¯}) ∼ A[α]{p¯}.
Hence, r = βb + (1 − β)w ∈ P o satisfies {r}[α]{p¯} ∼ A[α]{p¯}. By Axiom 6, it
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follows that {r}[α]{p} ∼ A[α]{p}, and so
Io(αϕA + (1− α)k) = Io(ϕA[α]{p}) = Io(ϕ{r}[α]{p})
= αu(r) + (1− α)u(p) = αu(r) + (1− α)k
= αu(r) + (1− α)u(p¯) + (1− α)k
= Io(ϕ{r}[α]{p¯}) + (1− α)k
= Io(ϕA[α]{p¯}) + (1− α)k
= Io(αϕA + (1− α)ϕ{p¯}) + (1− α)k
= Io(αϕA) + (1− α)k,
establishing that Io is translation invariant.
Step 4: Io is vertically invariant.
The result follows from Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 20 in Maccheroni et al. [2004]
once we show that for all A ∈ Ao and k ∈ R such that ϕA + k ∈ Φo, there exists
some α ∈ (0, 1) satisfying ϕA
α
, ϕA+k
α
∈ Φo. To see this, let pθ = θp + (1 − θ)p¯ for
any p ∈ P and θ > 0 and note that for any given p ∈ P o there exists some θ > 1
such that pθ ∈ P o. Clearly if pθ ∈ P o, then pθ′ ∈ P o for any θ′ < θ.
Since A ∈ Ao is a finite set, there must exist some θ > 1 such that pθ ∈ P o for all
p ∈ A. Pick any such θ > 1, and call it θA. Since ϕA + k ∈ Φo, there must exist
some B ∈ Ao such that ϕB = ϕA + k. Similarly, B ∈ Ao is a finite set, and so
there must exist some θ > 1 such that pθ ∈ P o for all p ∈ B. Pick any such θ > 1,
and call it θB and let θ∗ = min{θA, θB}.
Let Aθ∗ = {pθ∗ : p ∈ A} ∈ Ao and Bθ∗ = {pθ∗ : p ∈ B} ∈ Ao. Observe
that v · pθ = θ(v · p) for any v ∈ V, p ∈ P , and θ > 0. Therefore, we have
ϕAθ∗ = θ∗ · ϕA ∈ Φo and ϕBθ∗ = θ∗ · ϕB ∈ Φo . Let α = 1/θ∗. We have shown
ϕA
α
, ϕA+k
α
∈ Φo as desired. Hence, by Maccheroni et al. [2004, Lemma 20], Io is
vertically invariant.
Step 5: Io is monotone.
Let A,B ∈ Ao such that ϕA ≥ ϕB. Since ϕA = ϕco(A) and ϕB = ϕco(B), it
follows that ϕco(A) ≥ ϕco(B). Moreover, it follows immediately from Lemma 1, that
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ϕco(A) ≥ ϕco(B) implies A D B. Hence, by Axiom 4, co(A) % co(B). As a result,
Axiom 3 implies Io(ϕA) ≥ Io(ϕB).
Step 6: Io is a niveloid.
Since Io is vertically invariant, the functional I∗ : Φo + R → R, defined by
I∗(ϕ+ k) = Io(ϕ) + k for all ϕ ∈ Φo, is the unique vertically invariant extension of
I∗ to the tube generated by Φo (Maccheroni et al. [2004, Lemma 22]). Moreover,
since Φo is a convex set and Io is a convex functional, the obvious adaption of
the arguments in Maccheroni et al. [2004] establishes that I∗ is also convex. We
now show that I∗ must also be monotone. By the first paragraph in the proof of
Lemma 24 in Maccheroni et al. [2004], it is sufficient to show that if ϕ, ψ ∈ Φo and
ϕ+ k ≥ ψ, then I∗(ϕ+ k) ≥ I∗(ψ).
Let A,B ∈ Ao and k ∈ R such that ϕA + k ≥ ϕB. Clearly there exists α ∈ (0, 1)
such that
α(ϕA + k) + (1− α)ϕB = αϕA + (1− α)ϕB + αk ∈ Φo.
Moreover, since ϕA + k ≥ ϕB, α(ϕA + k) + (1 − α)ϕB ≥ ϕB. Now assume, for
contradiction, that I∗(ϕA + k) < I∗(ϕB). Since I∗ is convex, this would imply
Io(ϕB) = αI∗(ϕB) + (1− α)I∗(ϕB)
> αI∗(ϕA + k) + (1− α)I∗(ϕB)
≥ I∗(α(ϕA + k) + (1− α)ϕB).
= Io(α(ϕA + k) + (1− α)ϕB)
which contradicts that Io is monotone, and thus I∗ must be monotone.
Since Io is vertically invariant, and its unique vertically invariant extension to the
tube generated by Φo, I∗, is monotone, Io is a niveloid by Lemma 23 in Maccheroni
et al. [2004]. In sum, we have shown that Io is a normalized convex niveloid.
We now extend Io to Φ. For any menu A ∈ A and number m ∈ N, define
Am = A[m−1
m
]{p¯} and denote ϕmA = ϕAm . Note that for all A ∈ A and m ∈ N,
Am ∈ Ao and ϕmA → ϕA uniformly as m→∞. Define the a functional I : Φ→ R
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by
I(ϕA) = lim
m→∞ I
o(ϕmA ) ∀A ∈ A.
Since Io is a niveloid, it is a continuous function, and so Io preserves convergence.
Thus, for any menu A ∈ A, the sequence {Io(ϕmA )}m∈N converges to a point in
[u∗, u∗] showing that I is well-defined. The following arguments show that I
preserves the properties of Io, i.e., it is also a normalized convex niveloid.
Since Io is a niveloid, we have Io(ϕmA )−Io(ϕmA ) ≤ max (ϕmA − ϕmA ) for any A,B ∈ A,
and m ∈ N. Thus we obtain,
I(ϕA)− I(ϕB) = lim
m→∞ (I
o(ϕmA ))− limm→∞ (I
o(ϕmB ))
= lim
m→∞ (I
o(ϕmA )− Io(ϕmB ))
≤ lim
m→∞ (max (ϕ
m
A − ϕmB ))
= lim
m→∞
m− 1
m
(max (ϕA − ϕB))
= max (ϕA − ϕB) ,
establishing that I is a niveloid.
Clearly I is normalized. Now let A,B ∈ A, and α ∈ [0, 1]. Since Φ is a convex set,
αϕA + (1− α)ϕB ∈ Φ, and so by convexity of Io we have
I(αϕA + (1− α)ϕB) = lim
m→∞
(
Io(ϕmA[α]B)
)
= lim
m→∞ (I
o(αϕmA + (1− α)ϕmB )
≤ lim
m→∞ (αI
o(ϕmA ) + (1− α)Io(ϕmB ))
= α lim
m→∞ I
o(ϕmA ) + (1− α) limm→∞ I
o(ϕmB )
= αI(ϕA) + (1− α)I(ϕB),
showing that I is convex. As a result, I is a normalized convex niveloid which
assumes values in K.
Since Φ is a convex subset of B(Σ, K) and I is a normalized convex niveloid, the
obvious adaption of the arguments in the proof of Lemma 27 in Maccheroni et al.
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[2004] establishes that
I(ϕ) = max
pi∈∆(V)
(〈ϕ, pi〉 − c∗(pi)) ∀ϕ ∈ Φ.
Hence, it remains to show that, for allA,B ∈ A, A % B if and only if I(ϕA) ≥ I(ϕB).
We establish the contrapositive for each direction.
First, suppose that A  B.
Using parts (i) and (ii), we can find p, q ∈ P such that A  {p}  {q}  B. Then
by Axiom 2, there exists some M ∈ N such that for all m ≥M ,
Am % {p}  {q} % Bm
Otherwise, it must be the case that {p} % A or B % {q}, a contradiction. Thus,
for all m ≥M , we must have
Io(ϕmA ) ≥ u(p) > u(q) ≥ Io(ϕmB )
Since weak inequalities are preserved in the limit, we obtain
I(ϕA) ≥ u(p) > u(q) ≥ I(ϕB)
and so I(ϕA) > I(ϕB).
For the converse, suppose that I(ϕA) > I(ϕB).
By construction, u∗ ≥ I(ϕA) > I(ϕB) ≥ u∗. Hence, there exist p, q ∈ P such that
I(ϕA) > u(p) > u(q) > I(ϕB).
Since I is continuous, there exists M ∈ N such that for all m ≥M ,
Io(ϕmA ) ≥ u(p) > u(q) ≥ Io(ϕmB ).
implying that for all m ≥M ,
Am % {p}  {q} % Bm
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Hence, by Axiom 2, it follows that
A % {p}  {q} % B,
and so A  B.
As a result, the function U : A → R, defined by U(A) = I(ϕA) represents %.
A.2.3 Indifference to the timing of the resolution of uncertainty
Our final lemma is used in the proof of Propositions 1 and 3. For a self-discipline
preference % represented by (u, c), it provides a necessary and sufficient condition
for there to be a common solution to the self-discipline choice problem for a finite
collection of menus. The argument follows the proof of Lemma 1 in De Oliveira
et al. [2016].
Let U : A → R and D : A → R represent, respectively, the value function and
policy correspondence of the self-discipline choice problem
max
pi∈∆(V)
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − c(pi))
with parameters (u, c).
For A1, ..., AN ∈ A and α1, ..., αN ∈ (0, 1) such that ∑Ni=1 αi = 1, denote by∑
i αiAi = {
∑
i αipi : pi ∈ Ai ∀i = 1, ..., N}. We observe (without proof) that U
has the following convexity property:
U(
∑
i
αiAi) ≤
∑
i
αiU(Ai).
Lemma 3. Let A1, ..., AN ∈ A and α1, ..., αN ∈ (0, 1) such that ∑Ni=1 αi = 1. Then
the following statements are equivalent:
(i) U(∑i αiAi) = ∑i αiU(Ai).
(ii) ⋂iD(Ai) 6= ∅.
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Proof. [(i) implies (ii)]: Let A1, ...., AN ∈ A and α1, ..., αN ∈ (0, 1) such that∑N
i=1 αi = 1 and U(
∑
i αiAi) =
∑
i αiU(Ai). We proceed by induction on N . If
N = 1, (ii) trivially holds. Now suppose that N > 1, and that (i) implies (ii) for
N − 1.
Without loss of generality, let α1 = mini αi, and set
B = α21− α1A2 + ...+
αN
1− α1AN .
Since αi/(1 − α1) ≤ 1 for all i = 2, ..., N , we have B ∈ A. By the convexity
property of U ,
U(B) ≤
N∑
i=2
(
αi
1− α1
)
U(Ai)
and
∑
i
αiU(Ai) = U
(∑
i
αiAi
)
= U (A1[α1]B) ≤ α1U(A1) + (1− α1)U(B).
Hence, we get
N∑
i=2
αiU(Ai) = (1− α1)U(B)
and
α1U(A1) + (1− α1)U(B) = U(A1[α1]B).
Now choose some pi ∈ D(A1[α1]B). Then
〈α1ϕA1 + (1− α1)ϕB, pi〉 − U (A1[α1]B) = c(pi) ≥ 〈ϕA1 , pi〉 − U (A1) .
Replacing U(ϕA1) with 1α1U (A1[α1]B)− 1−α1α1 U(B), and rearranging, we get
(1− α1) 〈ϕB, pi〉 − 1− α1
α1
U(B) ≥ (1− α1) 〈ϕA1 , pi〉 −
1− α1
α1
U (A1[α1]B) .
Multiplying both sides of the inequality by α1/(1−α1) and adding (1−α1) 〈ϕB, pi〉,
we get
〈ϕB, pi〉 − U(B) ≥ 〈α1ϕA1 + (1− α1)ϕB, pi〉 − U (A1[α1]B) ,
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which implies that 〈ϕB, pi〉−U(B) ≥ c(pi). It follows that pi ∈ D(B). An analogous
argument shows that pi ∈ D(A1). As a result,
D (A1[α1]B) ⊂ D(A1) ∩ D(B).
Since ∑Ni=2 αiU(Ai) = (1− α1)U(B), by the inductive assumption, D(B) ⊂ D(Ai)
for all i = 2, ..., N , and so D (∑i αiAi) ⊂ D(Ai) for all i = 1, ..., N . Since
D (∑i αiAi) 6= ∅, we have ⋂iD(Ai) 6= ∅.
[(ii) implies (i)]: Suppose (ii) holds, and letpi ∈ ⋂iD (Ai). Then
∑
i
αiU(Ai) =
〈∑
i
αiϕAi , pi
〉
− c(pi) ≤ U
(∑
i
αiAi
)
.
On the other hand, the convexity property of U implies
∑
i
αiU(Ai) ≥ U
(∑
i
αiAi
)
.
Hence, U(∑i αiAi) = ∑i αiU(Ai), and so (i) holds.
A.3 Proofs for the results in the text
Proof of Theorem 1
It is straightforward to show that a self-discipline preference satisfies Axioms 1–6
(in particular, Axiom 4 follows from the sufficiency part of Lemma 1). For the
converse, let % be a binary relation that satisfies Axioms 1–6. Then by Lemma 2,
(u, c∗) represents % and so % is a self-discipline preference.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let % be a self-discipline preference represented by (u, c).
[Part (i)]: It is straightforward to show that u represents the commitment ranking.
With the normalization u ∈ V , uniqueness follows by standard arguments.
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[Part (ii)]: By Lemma 2, (u, c∗) also represents %. It therefore remains to
show that c ≥ c∗ (establishing c∗ as the minimal self-discipline cost function).
By way of contradiction, suppose c(pi) < c∗(pi) for some pi ∈ ∆(V). Then, by
definition of c∗, there exists a menu A ∈ A such that 〈ϕA, pi〉 − u(pA) > c(pi), i.e.,
〈ϕA, pi〉 − c(pi) > u(pA). Hence, u(pA) = maxρ∈∆(V) (〈ϕA, ρ〉 − c(ρ)) > u(pA), a
contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1
Let % be a self-discipline preference with canonical representation (u, c∗), and let c
be another cost function such that (u, c) also represents %. By Theorem 2, c∗ ≤ c.
[Part (i)]: Let pi ∈ D(A|u, c) for some A ∈ A, and let pA be the singleton
equivalent of A. Hence, 〈ϕA, pi〉 − c(pi) = u(pA). Now suppose c(pi) > c∗(pi). Then
〈ϕA, pi〉 − c∗(pi) > u(pA) = max
ρ∈∆(V)
[〈ϕA, ρ〉 − c∗(ρ)] ,
a contradiction. Hence, c(pi) = c∗(pi).
[Part (ii)]: Let pi ∈ D(A|u, c) for some A ∈ A with singleton equivalent pA. From
part (ii),
〈ϕA, pi〉 − c∗(pi) = 〈ϕA, pi〉 − c(pi) = u(pA),
and so pi ∈ D(A|u, c∗).
Proof of Proposition 2
Let (u, c∗) be a canonical representation for a self-discipline preference. In the proof
of Lemma 2, part (iii), we show that c∗ is grounded. Since c∗ is the supremum over
linear functions, c∗ is convex. Finally, to establish u-monotonicity, let pi, ρ ∈ ∆(V)
with pi Du ρ. Then
〈ϕA, pi〉 ≥ 〈ϕA, ρ〉 ∀A ∈ A.
Hence,
sup
A∈A
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − u(pA)) ≥ sup
A∈A
(〈ϕA, ρ〉 − u(pA)) ,
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and so c∗(pi) ≥ c∗(ρ).
Proof of Theorem 3
Let %1 and %2 be self-discipline preferences with canonical representations (u1, c∗1)
and (u2, c∗2), respectively.
[(i) implies (ii)]: Suppose %2 has a stronger preference for commitment than %1.
Thus, for any p, q ∈ P , {p} %1 {q} implies {p} %2 {q}. We want to show that
also {p} %2 {q} implies {p} %1 {q} and so u2 = u1. Suppose, for contradiction,
that this is not the case; that is, there exist p, q ∈ P such that {p} %2 {q} and
{q} 1 {p}. Since {q} 1 {p}, we must have {q} %2 {p} and so {p} ∼2 {q}. Since
u2 is non-constant, there must exist some r ∈ P such that either {r} 2 {p} or
{p} 2 {r}. Suppose {r} 2 {p} (the argument in the opposite case is analogous).
Then {r}[α]{p}  {p} for all α ∈ (0, 1). On the other hand, since {q} 1 {p},
there exists some α ∈ (0, 1) such that {q} 1 {r}[α]{p}. Since %2 has a stronger
preference for commitment, it follows that {q} %2 {r}[α]{p} 2 {p} ∼2 {q}, which
is a contradiction.
Now consider a menu A and let {pA} ∼1 A and {qA} ∼2 A. Since %2 has a stronger
preference for commitment than %1, {pA} %2 {qA} and so u2(pA) ≥ u2(qA). As a
result, for any pi ∈ ∆(V),
c2(pi) = sup
A∈A
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − u2(qA))
≥ sup
A∈A
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − u1(pA))
= c1(pi).
[(ii) implies (i)]: Suppose that u1 = u2 and c1 ≤ c2. Let {p} %1 A for some
p ∈ P and A ∈ A. Then we have,
u2(p) = u1(p)
≥ max
pi∈∆(V)
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − c1(pi))
≥ max
pi∈∆(V)
(〈ϕA, pi〉 − c2(pi)) ,
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and so {p} %2 A.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let % be a self-discipline preference with canonical representation (u, c∗). It is
straightforward to show that random Strotz preferences satisfy Set Independence.
For the converse, define the functional U : A → R as in Lemma 2 part (iv).
Let A,B ∈ A and α ∈ (0, 1), and let pA and pB be singleton equivalents of A and
B, respectively. By Set Independence, {pA}[α]{pB} ∼ {pA}[α]B ∼ A[α]B. Hence,
U(A[α]B) = αU(A) + (1− α)U(B). By induction, for menus A1, ...., AN ∈ A and
α1, ...., αN ∈ [0, 1] such that ∑i αi = 1,
U(
∑
i
αiAi) =
∑
i
αiU(Ai).
By Lemma 3, it follows that ⋂iD(Ai|u, c∗) 6= ∅. Hence, the collection of closed sets
{D(A|u, c∗) : A ∈ A} has the finite intersection property. Since ∆(V) is compact,
it follows that ⋂A∈AD(A|u, c∗) 6= ∅.
Now let pi ∈ ⋂A∈AD(A|u, c∗). Then, for all menus A ∈ A,
U(A) = 〈ϕA, pi〉 − c(pi),
and so, for all menus A,B ∈ A,
A % B ⇔ 〈ϕA, pi〉 ≥ 〈ϕA, pi〉 .
Hence, is a random Strotz preference represented by (u, pi).
Proof of Proposition 3
Let u ∈ V, and let k : V → [0,∞] be lower semicontinuous and proper. Without
loss of generality, we assume that k is grounded. Denote by U : A → R the value
function, and by D : A ⇒ V the policy correspondence, corresponding to the
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self-discipline choice problem
max
v∈V
(ϕA(v)− k(v)) .
Let C : A⇒ A denote the choice correspondence induced by (u, k), defined by
C(A) = ⋃
v∈D(A|u,k)
arg max
p∈Mv(A)
u(p) ∀A ∈ A.
For a menu A and lottery p, denote by Wp = {w ∈ V : p ∈Mw(A)} ∩ D(A).
[Sufficiency]: Consider a menu A ∈ A with p ∈ C(A). Since % is a costly Strotz
preference, Wp 6= ∅ and there exists κ ∈ R+ such that k(w) = κ all w ∈ Wp. By
way of contradiction, suppose that κ > 0. Since k is grounded, it follows that
there exists q ∈ A such that u(p) > u(q). Since κ > 0, there exists α¯ ∈ (0, 1) such
that α¯(u(p)− u(q)) < κ. Hence, p /∈ C(A[α]{q}), contradicting vNM independence.
It follows that, for all menus A ∈ A and p ∈ C(A), w ∈ Wp implies k(w) = 0.
Hence, for any menu A, if p, q ∈ C(A), then w ∈ Wp ∪Wq implies k(w) = 0 and so
u(p) = u(q).
As a result, with an obvious abuse of notation, U(A) = u(C(A)). Now observe that
vNM Independence implies, for any A,B ∈ A and α ∈ (0, 1),
u (C(A[α]B)) = αu (C(A)) + (1− α)u (C(B)) .
Hence, % satisfies Set Independence.
[Necessity]: Suppose % satisfies Set Independence. By Lemma 3 and the argument
in the proof of Proposition 1, there exists v ∈ ⋂A∈AD(A), and so U(A) = ϕA(v)
for all A ∈ A. As a result, for any menu A ∈ A, C(A) = arg maxp∈Mv(A) u(p), and
C therefore satisfies WARP and vNM independence.
A.4 Models of temptation-driven behavior
In this Section, we briefly review some well-known models of temptation-driven
behavior referred to in the main text. All of these models have in common that
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temptations in period 2 can induce a desire for commitment in period 1.
A.4.1 Axioms
We start by reviewing some axioms referred to in the discussion. Let P denote the
set of non-trivial weak orders on A, and let %∈ P .
Upper Semicontinuity: For all A ∈ A, the set {B : B % A} is closed is the
Hausdorff topology on A.
Finiteness: For all A ∈ A, there exists a finite A′ ⊆ co(A) such that for all B,
A ⊆ co(B) ⊆ co(A) implies B ∼ A.
Set Betweenness: For all A,B ∈ A, A % B implies A % A ∪B % B.
Desire for Commitment: For all A ∈ A, there exists p ∈ A such that {p} % A.
Upper Semicontinuity (which is “one half” of Strong Continuity) and Finiteness
are technical axioms. However, Set Betweenness and Desire for Commitment reveal
temptation-driven behavior (see Gul and Pesendorfer [2001, Section 2] and Dekel
et al. [2009, Section 4])
A.4.2 Temptation-driven preferences
We now review some important models of temptation-driven behavior in the
menu-choice literature.
Self-control preferences and their generalizations Gul and Pesendorfer
[2001] characterize a model of self-control, where the DM compromises between
her temptation and normative rankings in period 2, incurring an opportunity cost.
Self-control: % is a self-control preference if there exists u, v ∈ Rn such that
U(A) = max
p∈A
u(p) + v(q)−max
q∈A
v(q) ∀A ∈ A
represents %.
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Let PSC denote the class of self-control preferences. Theorem 1 in Gul and
Pesendorfer [2001] shows that a preference relation is in PSC if and only if it
satisfies Strong Continuity, Set Independence and Set Betweenness.
Dekel et al. [2009] generalize self-control preferences by allowing the DM to be
affected by multiple temptations at once, and by allowing the set of temptations to
be random.
Multi-dimensional temptation: % is a multi-dimensional temptation preference
if there exists u ∈ Rn, I, J1, ...., JI ∈ N, (vi1, ..., viJi) ∈ Rn×Ji for all i = 1, ..., n, and
(α1, ..., αI) ∈ RI++ with
∑
i αi = 1, such that
U(A) =
∑
i
αi
(
max
p∈A
u(p)− ci(p,A)
)
∀A ∈ A
represents %, where
ci(p,A) =
 Ji∑
j=1
max
q∈A
vij(q)
− Ji∑
j=1
vij(p) ∀p ∈ P, A ∈ A.
Let PT denote the class of multi-dimensional temptation preferences. Theorem
1 in Dekel et al. [2009] shows that a preference relation is in PT if and only if it
satisfies Strong Continuity, Set Independence, Finiteness, Desire for Commitment
and a technical axiom called Approximate Improvements are Chosen (Dekel et al.
[2009, Axiom 4]).
Stovall [2010] characterizes the special case of multi-dimensional temptation where
only one temptation affects the DM at a time, but temptations can occur at
random.
Multiple temptation: % is a multiple temptation preferences if there exists
I ∈ N, u, v1, ...., vI ∈ Rn and (α1, ..., αI) ∈ RI++ with
∑
i αi = 1, such that
U(A) =
I∑
i=1
αi
(
max
p∈A
u(p) + vi(p)−max
q∈A
vi(p)
)
∀A ∈ A
represents %.
Let PMT denote the class of multiple temptation preferences. Theorem 1 in Stovall
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[2010] shows that a preference relation is in PMT if and only if it satisfies Strong
Continuity, Finiteness, Set Independence, and Weak Set Betweenness.
Noor and Takeoka [2010] take a different approach to generalize self-control, by
allowing convex costs of self-control.
Convex self-control: % is a convex self-control preference if there exist u, v ∈ Rn
and a continuous strictly increasing convex function γ : [0, u∗−u∗]→ R+ such that
U(A) = max
p∈A
(
u(p)− γ
[
max
q∈A
v(q)− v(p)
])
represents %.
Theorem 3 in Noor and Takeoka [2010] provides a characterization of the class of
convex self-control preferences PSCS. In particular, a convex self-control preference
satisfies Strong Continuity and Set Betweenness, but may violate Set Independence
(and Aversion to Randomization).
Strotz preferences and their generalizations Gul and Pesendorfer [2001]
also characterize a model of temptation where the DM is unable to exercise self-
control: in period 2, she is able to choose only from the tempting alternatives in a
menu.
Strotz: % is a Strotz preference if there exists u, v ∈ V such that
U(A) = ϕA(v) ∀A ∈ A
represents %.
Let PSt denote the class of Strotz preferences. Theorem 3 in Gul and Pesendorfer
[2001] shows that a preference relation is in PSC ∪ PSt if and only if it satisfies
Mixture Continuity, Upper Semicontinuity, Set Independence, and Set Betweenness.
Chatterjee and Krishna [2009] generalize Strotz preferences: in period 1 the DM is
uncertain if she will be tempted in period 2, but if she is tempted she succumbs.
Dual-self: % is a dual-self preference if there exists u, v ∈ V and α ∈ [0, 1] such
that
U(A) = αϕA(u) + (1− α)ϕA(v) ∀A ∈ A
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represents %.
Theorem 1 in Chatterjee and Krishna [2009] provides an axiomatic character-
ization of the class PDS of dual-self preferences. Olszewski [2007] character-
izes the subclass PMM ⊂ PDS of maxmin preferences, where v = −u, and so
U(A) = αmaxp∈A u(p) + (1− α) minp∈A u(p) for all A ∈ A.
The class of random Strotz preferences PRS in Definition 1 generalizes PDS by
allowing for greater uncertainty about the temptation ranking in period. Chan-
drasekher [2014] generalizes random Strotz by allowing for Knightian uncertainty
regarding temptation rankings, inducing incompleteness in the preference relation
over menus.
A.4.3 Relation with self-discipline
Theorem 1 in Dekel and Lipman [2012] shows that PRS ⊇ PMT ⊇ PSC . Clearly,
PRS ⊇ PDS ⊇ (PMM ∪ PSt). Moreover, it follows from the axiomatic characteriza-
tions in Dekel et al. [2009] and Noor and Takeoka [2010] that PT ∩PCSC = PSC . It
follows from our results that self-discipline preferences have the following relation
with these models of temptation-driven behavior.
Corollary 2. Let PSD be the class of self-discipline preferences. Then:
(i) PSD ⊇ PRS ⊇ PMT ⊇ PSC.
(ii) PSD ⊇ PRS ⊇ PDS ⊇ (PMM ∪ PSt).
(iii) (PSD ∩ PCSC) = (PT ∩ PCSC) = PSC.
(iv) (PSD ∩ PT ) = PMT .
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